

# A Survey of Election Administration in Nigeria: An Analysis of 2007 and 2011 National Assembly Elections in Taraba State

U. D. Jongur and A. Bobboji

Department of Political Science and Administration, Adamawa State University, Mubi, Nigeria.  
Email: jongur74@adsu.edu.ng

**Abstract.** Election administration into the National legislative houses of Nigeria from the Taraba state senatorial districts and constituencies in 2007 and 2011 has so much to be desired in the context of credibility of the electoral process which was characterized by corruption in vote buying and physical, and psychological violence under a scenario of poor voter education. The paper used structured questionnaire to gather primary data and found that electoral umpires at the national and state levels lack the power and will to enforce electoral law on offenders to the latter in order to deepen election credibility and indeed democracy and democratization based on social contract theory. The paper recommends strong voter education, open and transparent electoral process to be monitored by local and international observers, and enforcement of all electoral laws despite threats of corruption.

**Keywords:** Election, management, bodies, democracy, Taraba, Nigeria.

## 1 Introduction

Elections are processes that allow citizens of a country or organization to vie for an office and to be involved in the process of selection, nomination or voting by poll or lot in order to occupy public office as provided by law. Election is the most important tool of democracy and democratization, a system of government where people rule themselves through elections directly or through their representatives. For an election(s) to be credible and admissible, it should start from registration to voting or officially show of interest for an elective office, through display of voters register, internal democracy of political parties in the selection or as an independent candidate, campaigns, polling, and declaration of results, and also resolution of electoral contestations in a tribunal or the courts. The role of election management bodies in the state's polity and democracy, and democratization is critical and indeed central to elections which allows for an umpire to manage elections that would deepen good governance in an open and transparent manner that is fair to the greatest number, thus, craving for itself credibility and legitimacy. By the process aforesaid, it is directly opposite to any form of rule or government that opposes popular rule of a democracy and thereby becomes largely authoritarian.

The problematic therefore is the declining of electoral credibility with the return of democracy in the study area.

## 2 Review of Selected Literature

One basic framework of contemporary liberal democratic theory is the efficient analyses of management of elections as a fundamental prerequisite for democratic order. Yet, the chequered history of election administration in Nigeria has been an unpleasant one. As a matter of fact, the period under study, has been characterized by series of electoral fraud and violence, though of varying magnitude. Indeed, there has been a linear relationship between Nigeria's history of election administration and the inability to enthrone a democratic order in the country. However, the implications of Nigeria's electoral history for the enthronement of a democratic order are yet to be exhaustively explored. Hence, it is not incontrovertible to say that elections are sine qua non to the success of liberal Democracy. Indeed, to say that the two are intricately linked is to state the obvious, for the proper functioning and viability of democracy, elections must be free and fair and provides significant choices for voters, precise counting of votes and accurate reporting of same devoid of sadism and intimidation.(Udogu, 2005:230).

In the same vein, Churchill once said, 'Democracy is the worst form of Government, but is still the best we know. This assertion is certainly true when situated within the context of authoritarian rules that is purely based on and largely depends on the whims and caprices of the autocratic leader. The early 1990's saw waves of competitive, multiparty elections in Africa. These unprecedented contexts can be described as "founding" diverse multiparty elections in the sense that, for many countries they marked a transition from an extended period of authoritarian rule to a new era of fledgling democratic government.

Nevertheless, elections remain the basic ingredient of democracy and voting occupies a central place in the democratic practice. Thus, elections are generally seen under liberal democratic government as the defining institutions of democracy. Although it is possible to have elections without democracy, you cannot have democracy without elections. That is to say that, while elections and democracy are not synonymous, elections remain fundamental not only for the installation of democratic government, but for broader democratic consolidation. Hence, the importance of Election Management Bodies (EMB) cannot be overemphasized, since elections as central as they are, cannot take place in a vacuum. Thus, in Nigeria and indeed across the globe, EMBs have been responsible for all elections been conducted.

Since returning to civilian rule in the fourth republic, the quality of elections had progressively declined. Although the country has managed to transit from one administration to another, hardly any election conducted has been insulated from one form of fundamental irregularity or the other, ranging from electoral malpractices, violence and various degrees of disruptions. The independence and impartiality of the country's election management bodies, that is, both the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and State Independent Electoral Commission (SIECS) and other institutions involved in election administration are at best controversial. The same perception of partiality, ineffectiveness and inefficiency affects other institutions, especially the security agencies, critical for the successful conduct of credible election that meets international standards and best practices. It is in this regard that the 2007 elections were nationally and internationally adjudged as the most acutely "unfree" and unfair in Nigeria history (Ibrahim, 2007; International Crisis Group, 2007; Rawlence and Alban-Lackey, 2007) in (Aluigba, 2009:24). While other scholars and analysts (*African Research Bulletin*, 2007; Rotberg 2007; Suberu 2007. Oshodi, 2007; Odion-Akhaine, 2008) in (Aluigba, 2009:24) were unanimous in its assessment as the worst in the country's political history. The Uwai's report succinctly and aptly sum up the scenario when it states that:

The 85-year old history of Nigeria on elections shows a progressive degeneration of outcomes. Thus, the 2007 elections are believed to be the worst since the first elections held in 1922. It is on record that the 2007 was the first-third consecutive election in the country. Both the First and Second Republics were overthrown by the Military after a heavily rigged and tumultuous second consecutive election. The third Republic was aborted with the annulment of the election by the Military in June, 1993. Thus, from the foregoing, scholars have posited that Nigeria has a history of problematic second round elections, but has never had a successful third round in a republic's checkered election history. The Nigeria Constitution imposed a two term limit on the president and state Governors and there was desperate bid to amend the constitution to pave way for their third term ambitions. Hence, the prevailing atmosphere became politically charged and volatile. President Obasanjo further attested to this when he personally declared that the 2007 election was a "do or die affair" (Ojo, 2011:1).

However, at the other end of the spectrum, most available literature and commentaries on elections since the dawn of the 4th Republic overwhelmingly suggest that the 2011 general elections, even though by no means a perfect Elections, were seen as a departure from this successive deplorable, unwholesome negative trend. Credible International and Domestic Observer Groups noted that despite various challenges as a "significant improvement" over previous election, while the "Economist Magazine" called it "the first credible election in Nigeria since the end of military rule 12 years ago. In similar vein, Johnnie Carson, the then U.S Assistant Secretary of state for African Affairs opined that "it is off to a good start" we have acknowledged the good work of Jega and the work of Nigerian Youth Corps members. Nigeria should be extraordinary proud of these young men and women who managed this process in a fair way". These encomiums by International and Domestic Observer Groups are by no means an extraordinary break, thought, to be unprecedented in the political experience of election administration during the fourth Republic dispensation. From 1999 - 2007, the 2011 elections no doubt saw a remarkable improvement in election administration in Nigeria.

Against this background, the assessment of the importance of the role of the INEC, which is an administrative public institution, became imperative. In particular, the administrative measures taken by the INEC which impacted either positively or negatively on the overall quest for democratization in Nigeria became imperative. In this regard, the researcher was motivated to undertake the research with a view to examine critically the various administrative innovations and strategies adopted in 2007 and 2011 by the INEC in election administration as well as the modest achievement recorded vis-a-vis, the challenges and possible impediments to future elections in Nigeria. In addition, it will also enable the study to find out the efficacy and plausibility or otherwise of the 2011 election over and above the 2007 and vice versa. An Election Management Body is the body legally responsible for managing elections and other instrument of direct democracy. It is essential that electoral management bodies function according to the principles of transparency, accountability, professionalism and efficiency and their composition (transparency. org; 2013). All over the world, Electoral Management Bodies are created as umpires for electoral activities. No election has ever been conducted without an umpire and the success of elections are Judged by the level of transparency and commitment of the electoral body that conducted them .In the case of Nigeria, the independence and impartiality of the country's election management bodies have been at best controversial. More often, Electoral Management Bodies have generally been adjudged as appendages of the ruling party and the executive arm of government.

The body according to Ujo, (2012:119) (Ajayi 2007:46) and (Likoti 2009:31) is an organization or body which has the sole purpose of, and is largely responsible for, managing some or all of the elements that are essential for the conduct of elections and of direct democracy instruments such as referendums, citizens initiatives and recalled votes if those are part of the legal framework. Thus, the administrative institutions responsible for conducting elections are known as Election Management Bodies (EMBs). Although, the foregoing definitions of electoral administration emphasize the existence of an independent electoral body upon which the administration of elections is incumbent, it should be noted that experience in some countries across the globe indicate that election administration is not necessarily incumbent on an independent body. Indeed, despite the popularity of independent EMB's across the globe, in some countries election administration is the responsibility of government agencies. Thus, the Election Management Bodies (EMBs) enter into contract with the people that they will discharge their responsibilities impartially. The essential elements of EMB comprised of:

- i. Determining who is eligible to vote
- ii. Receiving and validating the nominations of electoral participants
- iii. Conducting polling
- iv. Counting the votes, and
- v. Tabulating the votes.

Thus, from the foregoing, the functions of the EMB are well encapsulated as all-encompassing from the pre-election arrangements to the conduct of the election and the declaration of results and winners. Similarly, (Ujo, 2012:120) opined that there are essentially three major models of EMB's which are:

- i. Independent Model
- ii. Government Model
- iii. Mixed Model

#### **Independent Model**

Under this typology, the EMB is instructionally independent and relatively autonomous from the executive arm of government. The EMB manages its own budget. The EMB is not accountable to a government ministry or department but accountable only to the National Assembly or judiciary or the Commander in Chief. Examples of countries with Independent model include: Nigeria, Ghana South Africa, Australia Bosnia, Georgia, India, Indonesia, Burkina Faso, Canada, Thailand and Uruguay.

#### **Government Model**

Under this system, elections are organised and managed by the executive branch of government through ministry or local authorities. Countries which use this model include: Denmark, New Zealand, Singapore, Switzerland, Tunisia, UK and United States.

#### **Mixed Model**

The features of the mixed model include:

1. The existence of dual structure composed of policy, monitoring of supervisory EMB, which is Independent of the executive branch of government.

2. Implementation of EMB located within a department or local government. Countries currently using this model are; France, Japan, Spain, Mali and Togo

Ajayi (2007) further identified four core elements of Election Management Bodies (EMBs) as:

- i. Receiving and validating the nomination of electoral participants
- ii. Conducting polling,
- iii. Counting the votes,
- iv. Tabulating the votes.

In the same vein, Elklit (2006:6) in Moveh, (2007:42) categorized Election Management Bodies (EMBs) into three, these are; An office or agency within the civil service or governmental structure, most often in the ministry of Home Affairs or its equivalent. This model is primarily found in older democracies in western industrialized countries, and it is of numerous categories.

A model similar to (1) above but under some supervisory authority.

A more or less independent and self-contained Election Management Bodies (EMBs) often term Electoral Commission. This system is usually established under a Board of Directors with an implementing Secretariat under a Chief Electoral Officer. This type is usually prevalent in most new democracies (Nigeria inclusive).

In similar vein, (Ujo.2012:121) classified EMB based on structure as:

- i. PERMANENT EMBs; This type exist whether election is been conducted or not. The staff enjoys permanent tenure while the member of the board enjoys a fixed tenure. Countries under this typology include Nigeria, Ghana, Brazil, Canada, Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa, Thailand and the Philippines.
- ii. TEMPORARY EMBs; This category exist only during elections. Civil Servants are deployed from other ministries to the electoral institution to conduct elections. Examples of countries with temporary EMBs are Bulgaria and Romania.
- iii. CENTRALISED EMBs: This type is peculiar to the unitary system of government. Hence all Decision making power is centralised including election matters. Costa Rica, Ghana and the Philippines are typical examples.
- iv. DECENTRALISED EMBs; This type exist in most federal system of government. The power to conduct election is decentralised. Nigeria is a typical example where INEC and SIEC co-exist with clear mandate awarded to each by the constitution.

Finally, Ujo, (2012:122). The guiding principles of all EMBs are:

- Independence
- Impartiality
- Integrity
- Transparency
- Efficiency
- Professionalism
- Service mindedness

Therefore, the EMBs no doubt occupies a central and strategic position in the electoral process and as such is sine qua non to the success of democracy and democratization in Nigeria in particular and the world at large. Since they are constitutionally saddled with the responsibility of election administration. The most desired free, fair and credible election that meet international standard and best practice will remain a mirage unless and until a proper diagnosis and X-ray of the intricacies and challenges surrounding the august body is squarely address. Independence, impartiality, integrity and professionalism remain the core pillars of EMBs Hence, the need for the necessary mechanism to be put in place that will guarantee and ensure that this aforementioned attributes are observed enforced for efficient and effective functioning of EMBs in Nigeria.

The social contract theory as propounded by Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Jean Rousseau constitute the framework of the paper. They conceive governance on the basis of popular contract between government and 'the Govern', the people who becomes its followership. In the treatise, they see the followership as an active and responsible larger group of society to be able to operationalized democracy as its 'life line' in which the hallmark of democracy of transparency and accountability is there for the people to gauge through its process of election for support in voting into power or voting out.

### 3 Discussion

The nationwide poll conducted in 2007 and 2011 was at best a formality. There was unprecedented rigging, ballot stuffing, falsification of results, intimidation of voters and direct assault on the people. In some extreme cases, voting did not take place. (European Union: 2007, Human Rights Watch: 2007, Transition Monitoring Group: 2007). The contestation resulting from this and the near worldwide condemnation largely informed the decision of the number one beneficiary, Alhaji Musa Yaradua, President elect to personally admit publically that the process of the election that brought him to power had been flawed and that the INEC had been culpable. (Ojo, 2011:2).

Similarly, president Yaradua was also reputed to have bluntly said:

*“No matter the legislations, no matter the efforts we put at electoral reforms, unless we the political leaders change our attitude towards election, we will continue to have problems. ... “Now that journalist has left and all of us are politicians, we should be able to speak the truth,” he began. “If we will be honest with ourselves, we all know how we rig elections in this country. We compromise the security agencies, we pay the electoral officials and party agents while on the eve of the election we merely distribute logistics all designed to buy the votes...”*  
(Adeniyi, 2011:115-116)

Against this backdrop, the situation was not any different in Taraba State. However, In this regard, and in line with Elkit and Raymond Model of analysis adopted as a frame work of analysis in this study, which opined that any dispassionate and meaningful analysis of any serious election administration could be broadly grouped into three, namely:

- i. Pre-election conditions.
- ii. Elections period and
- iii. Post elections period is employed in this study.

**Pre-election Period:** The basic Pre election requirements globally endorsed and accepted standard of a leveled field election environment includes that the will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of the government as expressed in periodic elections. While ICCPR emphasised that every citizens shall have the right and the opportunity to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections. International convention has also imposes on nations two broad standards namely Universal Equal Suffrage of a citizens and a Secret ballot. Thus, from the foregoing, the Pre-election period entails; Universal suffrage, freedom to register as a voter or run for public office as well as the quality and genuinely of the voters registers and freedom of information among others. Voter expectation is remarkably uniform and transcends party and political affiliation. Indeed, what electorates seek are modern, efficient and responsive administrative performance. Hence, for democracy to function properly, local, states and Federal Government must foster an election administration system that achieves the highest standard of accuracy, convenience, efficiency and security.

In this regard, during the period under review, while it is on record that both the 2007 and 2011 general elections guaranteed adult suffrage, where all eligible adult, 18 and above, were given the chances to vote or be voted for, but the 2007 elections witnessed mass rigging and imposition of candidates and under age voting. Indeed, in some cases, results were declared even before collation of results were completed, (TMG, EU and Common Wealth Observer Groups). Similarly, the 2007 voters registers was a sham as many eligible voters were disfranchised through harp hazard, ill equipped and hasty process of bio metric registration introduced. Skepticism and apprehension about the feasibility of a successful transition are engendered by the prevailing difficulties in terms of growing violence and failing electronic voter registration exercise which was widely believed to be artificially and officially created obstacles designed to ensure that the 2007 election fail (Kunle 2007:142). This defects disfranchised voters who were otherwise prepared to discharge their civic responsibility and made false results declaration as coming from those polling stations before official declaration. In addition, equality of campaign opportunities was largely compromised. Indeed, the Obasanjo government used the anti-corruption agencies and INEC itself to witch hunt perceived enemies or potential threat to his political interest as attested to in the case of Atiku Abubakar as well as Mr Danladi Baido the PDP duly elected gubernatorial flag bearer of the party in Taraba State who was illegally disqualified by the INEC. As a result, Pharm. Danbaba Suntai, who was not even among those that contested for the PDP primaries,

was imposed as the PDP gubernatorial flag bearer. He eventually emerged as the governor of the state in the 2007 election.

However, in 2011 election there were an appreciable improvement in the process with the introduction of biometric voters register which allows for appreciable break through both in terms of the transparency and coverage. INEC in the 2011 voter registration system had virtually photographs of all registrants as well as other biometrics details such as finger prints, age and other physical features. More than 120,000 direct data capture machines were deployed in the in the 120,000 designated polling units across the country. At the end, a total of 73, 528, 0480 were registered. This development, if improved upon and sustained, will indisputably create a virile foundation for future credible elections in the country. (Electoral magazine, 2011.6)

**Election period:** The ability of the INEC to be impartial and just to all and sundry as well as the enabling environment for the independent domestic and international monitors and observers to discharge their responsibilities with diligence. Accessible polling places that do not discriminate against voters' preference, with transparent ballot boxes and ballot papers as well as Secret ballot to ensure confidentiality and a transparent polling stations and counting and recounting procedures before party agents and the voting public. In this aspect too, the 2011 election was far better than the 2007 in terms of the transparency and confidentiality of the entire voting process including counting and recounting process. In this regard too, the 2011 indicates an appreciable break from the past in terms of transparent polling and counting and recounting procedures before party agents and the voting public as well as active presence and participation of independent monitors and above all in terms of the relative neutrality of the INEC.

**Post-election.** The post-election period is essentially predicated on whether there is clear rules for challenging the outcome of vote counts and contestation at appellate levels as well as the extent to which mechanisms are put in place to punish electoral malpractices or offenders. In addition, the proceedings at the Electoral tribunals or Courts must be speedy, fair and transparent. In this regard, during the period under review, the volume of litigations recorded sum up the post-election scenario of 2007 and 2011. The 2007 elections were so contested that it generated an astonishing 1,750 petitions and 6,180 electoral litigations at the courts across the country as compared to the 733 filed at various petition Tribunals across the country post 2011 elections (Jide, 2011:2).. Nevertheless, both the 2007 and 2011 elections witnessed the inability or unwillingness of the INEC to prosecute and punish electoral offenders.

In similar vein, the character of the 2007 and 2011 Taraba state National Assembly general elections differ fundamentally when viewed within the prism of INEC results of the period under study below.

#### National Assembly Election 2007

##### Summary of Results (Fed. Constituency)

Name of State: Taraba

Code: 34

Name of Fed. Const. Bali/Gassol

Code: FC/340/tr

S/N	Name of LGA	Code	Total No. Regd.	Voters Received by Parties				Total Valid Votes	Rejected Votes	Total Votes Cast
				AC	ANPP	NDP	PDP			
1	Bali	02	90,756	2,077	9,793	309	72288	84,470	1195	85662
2	Gassol	05	123,916	8,708	53,350	67	49,632	9280	2106	113863
<b>Total</b>			<b>214,672</b>	<b>10,785</b>	<b>63,143</b>	<b>376</b>	<b>121,920</b>	<b>93,750</b>	<b>3301</b>	<b>199525</b>

Source: Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) obtained through survey (2014).

ACN =5.4%, ANPP =31.6%, NDP =0.1%, PDP =61.1%

Total Votes Casted = 199,525

**National Assembly Election 2007****Summary of results (Fed. Constituency)**Name of state: **Taraba**Code: **34**Name of fed. Const. **Ibi/Wukari**Code: **FC/342/TR**

S/N	Name of LGA	Code	Total No. Regd.	Votes Received by Parties					Total Valid Votes	Rejected Votes	Total Votes Cast
				AC	ANPP	NDP	PDP	PPA			
1	Ibi	06	47793	3202	1545	117	34518	5122	44505	417	44921
2	Wukari	14	111933	19655	15259	3500	32602	356013	427026	938	427964
<b>Total</b>			<b>159,726</b>	<b>22,857</b>	<b>16,804</b>	<b>3,617</b>	<b>67,120</b>	<b>361,135</b>	<b>471,531</b>	<b>1,355</b>	<b>472,885</b>

Source: Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) obtained through survey (2014).

**AC = 0.4%, ANPP = 4.0%, NDP = 0.7%, PDP = 76.3%, PPA = 14.1%****Total Votes Casted = 472,885****National Assembly Election 2007****Summary of Results (Fed. Constituency)**Name of state: **Taraba**Code: **34**Name of Fed. Const. **Jalingo/Yorro/Zing**Code: **FC/343/TR**

S/N	Name of LGA	Code	Total No. Regd.	Voters Received by Parties						Total Valid Votes	Rejected Votes	Total Votes Cast
				AC	ANPP	PDP	PPA	MDJ	PRP			
1	Yorro	07	78640	8808	16,065	16,042	384	114	74	41,487	983	42,470
2	Jalingo	15	32,781	721	1,233	29,202	65	45	8	31,274	352	31,626
3	Zing	16	55,734	6,475	1,930	35,798	175	70	39	44,487	1,806	46,293
<b>Total</b>			<b>167,155</b>	<b>16004</b>	<b>19,228</b>	<b>81,042</b>	<b>624</b>	<b>229</b>	<b>121</b>	<b>117,248</b>	<b>3,141</b>	<b>120,389</b>

Source: Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) obtained through survey (2014).

**AC = 13.2%, ANPP = 15.9%, PDP = 67.3%, PPA = 0.5%, MDJ = 0.1%, PRP = 0.1%****Total Votes Casted = 120,389****National Assembly Election 2007****Summary of Results (Fed. Constituency)**Name of State: **Taraba**code: **34**Name of const. **Taraba South**code: **SD/100/TR**

S/N	Name of LGA	Code	Total No. Regd.	Voters Received by Parties						Total Valid Votes	Rejected Votes	Total Votes Cast	
				AC	ANPP	DPP	MDJ	NDP	PDP				PPA
1	Ussa	13	53,627	451	28	-	-	1	51,550	510	52,540	226	52,766
2	Ussa II	5A	18,529	250	23	7	3	8	15,019	392	15,702	84	15,786
3	Ibi	06	47,793	850	898	122	12	78	21,567	20,845	44,372	443	44,815
4	Wukari	014	111,933	7,947	4760	1175	8	247	63,445	28,312	105,894	1,100	106,994
5	Takum	012	98,847	5,102	1,301	50	-	9	73,751	12,625	92,837	341	93,178
6	Donga	03	100,455	6,925	2,121	105	3	10	82,194	1,161	92,519	327	92,846
<b>Total</b>			<b>330,729</b>	<b>21,525</b>	<b>9131</b>	<b>1459</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>353</b>	<b>307,526</b>	<b>63,845</b>	<b>403,861</b>	<b>2,521</b>	<b>406,382</b>

Source: Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) obtained through survey (2014).

**AC = 5.2%, ANPP = 2.2%, DPP = 0.3%, MDJ = 0.0%, NDP = 0.1%, PDP = 75.6%, PPA = 15.7%****Total Votes Casted = 406,382**

**National Assembly Election 2007  
Summary of Results (sent. District)**

Name of State: Taraba

Code: 34

Name of Const. : Taraba north

Code: SD/102/TR

S/N	Name of LGA	Code	Total No. Regd.	Voters Received by Parties					Total Valid Votes	Rejected Votes	Total Votes Cast	
				PDP	ANPP	PPA	NDP	AC				DPP
1	Ardokola	01										
2	Jalingo	07	32,781									
3	K/Lamido	08										
4	Lau	10										
5	Yoro	15	78640									
6	Zing	16	55,734									
<b>Total</b>				<b>225,781</b>	<b>30,744</b>	<b>1,464</b>	<b>501</b>	<b>21,466</b>	<b>583</b>	<b>280,727</b>	<b>6,578</b>	<b>287,305</b>

Source: Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) obtained through survey (2014).

PDP= 78.6%, ANPP = 10.7%, AC = 8.34%, PPA = 0.51%, NDP = 0.17%, DPP = 0.20%

**Total Votes Casted = 287,305**

**National Assembly Election 2007  
Summary of Results (Fed. Constituency)**

Name of State: TARABA

Code: 34

Name of const. Taraba Central

Code: SD/101/TR

S/N	Name of LGA	Code	Total No. Regd.	Voters Received by Parties					Total Valid Votes	Rejected Votes	Total Votes Cast
				CAN	ANPP	DPP	NDP	PDP			
1	BALI	02	90,756	2054	9060	163	120	73368	84765	1388	86,153
2	GASHAKA	04	31,033	1692	1321	161	168	25,973	29315	374	29,684
3	GASSOL	05	123,916	6,974	13,993	130	39	90,442	111,582	2,624	114185
4	KURMI	09	58,676	1073	698	129	157	54,099	56155	317	56,472
5	SARDAUNA	11	95,124	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>TOTAL</b>			<b>399,455</b>	<b>11,793</b>	<b>25,075</b>	<b>583</b>	<b>484</b>	<b>243,882</b>	<b>281,814</b>	<b>4,703</b>	<b>286,494</b>

Source: Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) obtained through survey (2014).

AC =4.1%, ANPP = 0.7%, DPP = 0.2%, NDP = 0.1%, PDP = 85.1%

**Total of Votes Casted = 286,494**

**National Assembly Election 2011  
Summary of Results (Fed. Constituency)**

Name of State: Taraba

Code: 34

Name of Fed. Const. Bali/Gassol

Code: FC/340/TR

S/N	Name of LGA	Code	Total No. Regd.	Voters Received by Parties					Total Valid Votes	Rejected Votes	Total Votes Cast	
				CAN	ANPP	APGA	CPC	NTP				PDP
1	Bali	02	88626	6330			8264		29568	44162	4190	48352
2	Gassol	05	129106	2518			7337		20783	30638	2777	33415
<b>Total</b>			<b>217732</b>	<b>8,848</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>15,601</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>50,351</b>	<b>74,800</b>	<b>6,967</b>	<b>81767</b>

Source: Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) obtained through survey (2014).

ACN =10.8%, ANPP = 0.0%, APGA = 0.0%, CPC = 19.0%, NTP = 0.0 %, PDP = 61.5%

**Total Votes Casted = 81767**



**National Assembly Election 2011****Summary of Results (Fed. Constituency)**

Name of State: Taraba

Code: 34

Name of Fed. Const. Ibi/Wukari

CODE: FC/343/TR

S/N	Name of LGA	Code	Total No. Regd.	Voters Received by Parties				Total Valid Votes	Rejected Votes	Total Votes Cast
				ACN	CPC	LABOUR	PDP			
1	Ibi	06	54411	8342	1483	794	12893	23512	2213	25725
2	Wukari	14	151154	26824	4070	1785	34403	67082	6183	73265
<b>Total</b>			<b>205545</b>	<b>35,166</b>	<b>5,553</b>	<b>2,579</b>	<b>47,296</b>	<b>90,594</b>	<b>8,396</b>	<b>98,990</b>

Source: Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) obtained through survey (2014).

ACN = 7.4%, CPC = 5.6%, LP = 2.6%, PDP = 47.7%

**Total Votes Casted = 98,990****National Assembly Election 2011****Summary of Results (Fed. Constituency)**

Name of State: Taraba

Code: 34

Name of Fed. Const. Yororo/Zing/Jalingo

Code: SD/344/TR

S/N	Name of LGA	Code	Total No. Regd.	Voters Received by Parties						Total Valid Votes	Rejected Votes	Total Votes Cast
				CAN	ANPP	CPC	LP	NSDP	PDP			
1	Jalingo	07	141378	10981	517	2611	795	9062	24161	6193	303554	
2	Yororo	15	52686	7895	670	35301	738	185	15665	60454	5937	66391
3	Zingo	16	58697	6794	481	3885	332	282	8582	20356	5177	25533
<b>Total</b>			<b>252761</b>	<b>25,670</b>	<b>1,668</b>	<b>41,797</b>	<b>1,865</b>	<b>662</b>	<b>33,309</b>	<b>104,971</b>	<b>17,307</b>	<b>122,278</b>

Source: Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) obtained through survey (2014).

ACN = 20.9%, ANPP = 1.3%, CPC = 34.1%, LD = 1.5%, NSDP = 0.6 %, PDP = 27.2%

**Total Votes Casted = 122,278****National Assembly Election 2011****Summary of Results (Sent. District)**

Name of State: Taraba

Code: 34

Name of Sen. District: Taraba south

Code: SD/100/TR

S/N	Name of LGA	Code	Total No. Regd.	Voters Received by Parties					Total Valid Votes	Rejected Votes	Total Votes Cast
				CAN	CPC	LP	NTP	PDP			
1	Donga	03	87935	9431	1601	2639	56	10506	24233	1570	25803
2	Ibi	06	54411	28036	6125	5241	133	29177	68712	4407	73119
3	Takum	12	111675	11700	217	13	14	9980	21924	937	22861
4	Ussa	13	60911	19891	655	43	38	22701	43328	2936	46264
5	Wuakari	14	151134	11198	1624	106	26	33808	46762	1194	47956
<b>Total</b>			<b>466066</b>	<b>80,256</b>	<b>10,222</b>	<b>8,042</b>	<b>267</b>	<b>106,172</b>	<b>204,952</b>	<b>11,044</b>	<b>216,003</b>

Source: Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) obtained through survey (2014).

ACN = 3.8%, CPC = 4.7%, LP = 3.7%, NTP = 0.1%, PDP = 47.1%

**Total Votes Casted = 216,003**

**National Assembly Election 2011  
Summary of Results (Taraba sent. District)**

Name of state: **Taraba**

Code: **34**

Name of Sen. District: **Taraba central,**

Code: **sd/101/tr**

S/N	Name of LGA	Code	Total No. Regd.	Voters Received by Parties						Total Valid Votes	Rejected Votes	Total Votes Cast	
				CAN	ANPP	APGA	CPC	NTP	PDP				UNDP
1	Bali	02	8826	1252	166	148	6482	344	23527	31919	1710	33629	
2	Gashaka	04	70493	938	102	119	2137	156	10814	14266	761	15027	
3	Gassol	05	129106	2327	177	150	6850	274	36221	39149	2512	41661	
4	Kurmi	09	47579	2387	82	39	825	46	19273	22652	500	23152	
5	Sardauna	11	118530	4912	444	227	9606	416	36330	51935	3340	55275	
<b>Total</b>			<b>454334</b>	<b>11,816</b>	<b>971</b>	<b>683</b>	<b>19,050</b>	<b>1,236</b>	<b>126,165</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>159,921</b>	<b>8,823</b>	<b>168,744</b>

Source: Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) obtained through survey (2014).

= 7.0%, ANPP = 0.5%, APGA = 0.4%, CPC = 11.2%, NTP = 0.7%, PDP = 74.7%, UNDP = 0%

**Total Votes Casted = 168,744**

**National Assembly Election 2011  
Summary of Results (Taraba Sent. District)**

Name of state: **Taraba**

code: **34**

Name of Sen. District: **Taraba north**

code: **SD/102/TR**

S/N	Name of LGA	Code	Total No. Regd.	Voters Received by Parties						Total Valid Votes	Rejected Votes	Total Votes Cast	
				ACN	CPC	LP	NTP	PDP	PRP				SDMP
1	Ardokola	01	71758	10,711	1,011	524	116	13133	100	83	25678	2594	28272
2	Jalingo	07	141378	17681	4019	277	160	40713	126	99	63075	3587	66662
3	K/Lamido	08	123642	21985	3903	1077	161	29483	161	116	56886	4436	61322
4	Lau	10	61832	9830	2190	332	121	17033	124	76	29076	2743	32449
5	Yoro	15	52686	12764	1354	238	170	7730	207	165	22628	3160	25788
6	Zing	16	58697	19033	882	303	145	40713	117	143	61336	4037	65373
<b>Total</b>			<b>509993</b>	<b>92,004</b>	<b>13,359</b>	<b>2,751</b>	<b>873</b>	<b>148,805</b>	<b>835</b>	<b>682</b>	<b>259,309</b>	<b>20,557</b>	<b>279,866</b>

Source: Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) obtained through survey (2014).

ACN = 32.8%, CPC = 4.7%, LP = 0.9%, NTP = 0.3%, PDP = 53.1%, PRP = 0.2%, SDMP = 0.2%

**Total Votes Casted = 279,866**

The peculiar characteristics of the 2007 elections were the land slide or rather the overwhelming victor of the ruling party, the PDP. The percentage scored ranges from 76.3% of the total votes cast to 61.1 and 67.3% respectively. The 2011 National Assembly Elections in the State indicates an improved performance of the opposition as attested to the percentage scored compared to the 2007. To be specific, the ruling party scored 61.5% to 47.7% to win the two of the Three House of Representative under study. While the opposition party, CPC won one of the Three House of Representative in a highly contested elections with only 34.1% while the ruling party scored 27.2% and ACN scored 20.9% while the other percentage goes to the remaining minority opposition parties.

In similar vein, the Senatorial elections of the 2007 further asserted the pervasive dominance of the ruling party in the elections, for instance in all the three Senatorial Zones of the state, the ruling party had a landslide victory with 75.6% to 78.6% and 85.1% of the votes cast respectively. This one party trend and dominance during the 2007 election was in conformity with the prevailing trend of "do or die" of the ruling party. As a result of which many electorates became apathetical towards the elections as well as the mass rigging perpetrated. On the other hand, the 2011 indicates that the ruling party won the election in a keenly contested environment scoring 47.1% and 53.1%. One peculiar character of this

election is the improved performance of the opposition where they scored 38.8% to 32.8% percent respectively in the 2011 Senatorial elections.

Therefore, on the whole, the change in the trend and character of the election might not be unconnected to the enabling environment created by the Jonathan administration whose electoral reforms impacted on the Election Management Body, (INEC) the polity and the entire democratization process during the 2011 and which in essence, created an appreciable leveled field for both the ruling party and the opposition to thrive in a relatively competitive, free and fair environment. In other words, the ability of the PDP Jonathan Administration to uphold its social contractual agreement with the people can be situated within this context, which in turn, invariably informed the modest brake through recorded during the 2011 as compared to the 2007 environment which was largely perverted by the incumbent Obasanjo's desperation for third term re- election.

## 4 Findings

The paper found the following:

- i. That there is a significant relationship between the quality of election administration and credible election as clearly attested to by the outcome of the 2011 election which was adjudged by both domestic and international Observer Groups and other stake holders as far better than the 2007.
- ii. A very high percentage of respondents strongly agreed that there is a correlation between quality of leadership at governmental level and the attempt to enthrone genuine democracy.
- iii. The following were identified as some of the negative tendencies of election administration and democratization in Nigeria:
  - a. Corruption;
  - b. Lack of formidable opposition;
  - c. Lack of profound electoral reforms;
  - d. And lack of proper voter education and sensitization before, during, and after elections

## 5 Conclusion

It is on record that developing countries who faces challenges of poverty may not likely to have a robust democracy and democratization since true elections are based on ideology and conscience of the voter to be able to vote for his/her candidate of choice against other negative intervening variables that compromises evolution of quality leadership through elections but for ascension of corrupt money bags who undermine development of strong institutions for security and prosperity of all.

## 6 Recommendations

With the use of electronic instrument in voting in the 2011 election there was an appreciable improvement in the process which introduces biometric voters register that allows for appreciable break through both in terms of the transparency and coverage. INEC in the voter registration system had virtually captured photographs of all registered voters as well as other biometrics details such as finger prints, age and other physical features where more than 120,000 direct data capture machines were deployed in the in the 120,000 designated polling units across the country. At the end, a total of 73, 528, 0480 were registered. This development was used in the 2015 general elections, if improved upon and used in the 2019 general elections will indisputably create a virile foundation for future credible elections in the country, thereby deepening democracy.

Also important, the paper recommends enforcement of electoral laws to the latter so as to deepen democracy and democratization in the study area and indeed the country at large.

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